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ABSTRACT
It seems paradoxical to suggest that theories of learning might be used to
explain policy failure. Yet the Brexit fiasco connects with recent approaches
linking varieties of policy learning to policy pathologies. This article sets out to
explain the UK government’s (mis)management of the Brexit process from
June 2016 to May 2019 from a policy learning perspective. Drawing on
interviews with UK policy-makers and stakeholders, we ask how did the UK
government seek to learn during the Brexit negotiations? We consider four
modes of learning: reflexivity, epistemic, hierarchical, and bargaining. By
empirically tracing the policy process and scope conditions for each of these,
we argue that learning through the first three modes proved highly
dysfunctional. This forced the government to rely on bargaining between
competing factions, producing a highly political form of learning which
stymied the development of a coherent Brexit strategy. We argue that the
analysis of Brexit as a policy process – rather than a political event – reveals
how policy dynamics play an important role in shaping the political context
within which they are located. The article concludes that public policy analysis
can, therefore, add significant value to our understanding of Brexit
by endogenising accounts of macro political developments.
KEYWORDS Brexit; policy failure; policy fiascos; policy learning
Introduction
There is something paradoxical in attempting to explain policy fiascos with
theories of policy learning. We understand policy learning to mean the updat-
ing of beliefs about policy based on experiences, analysis or social interaction
(Checkel 2001; Hall 1993; Heclo 1974). It evokes processes whereby policy
actors gain a deeper or different understanding of the world around them,
causing them to alter their causal beliefs and to change their behaviour. In
a seminal article, Peter May (1992) connected policy learning and failure,
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but his argument was that evidence of failure should encourage reformulation
of public policies. It is more counterintuitive to start with failure as outcome to
be explained, as in the case of the Brexit process. Yet, the analysis of policy
fiascos sits well with recent approaches linking varieties of policy learning
to policy pathologies (Dunlop 2017; Dunlop and Radaelli 2013, 2018). This lit-
erature identifies four main modes of policy learning: reflexive, epistemic, hier-
archical or bargaining (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013; for empirical applications
see Di Giulio and Vecchi 2019; Polman 2018). The typology rests on two
main claims: (1) the mode of policy learning in a particular context is deter-
mined by the nature of key policy setting variables; and (2) the effectiveness
of learning through those modes is shaped by the presence or absence of
scope conditions. This allows us to generate empirical expectations about
the mode and effectiveness of policy learning in a particular context.
Applying the framework to Brexit, we set out to explain the UK govern-
ment’s (mis)management of the Brexit process since 2016 – this is our demar-
cation of the concept of policy fiasco. We ask how did the UK government
seek to learn during the Brexit negotiations? Answering this question allows
us to see how dysfunctional learning had an impact on the UK’s handling
of the issue. An important argument emerging from our analysis is that the
politics of Brexit does not determine the policy. Rather, the policy process
plays an important role in shaping the political context in which policy
dynamics are located. Our argument does not deny that Brexit is a highly
complex policy issue, the resolution of which will inevitably be long and
arduous. Rather, our contribution is to show that the intractability of Brexit
is in part due to dysfunctional forms of learning within government, which
seriously hindered the development of a coherent policy response.
It is worth briefly reflecting on the analytical boundaries of the article. First,
we examine the domestic Brexit negotiations: specifically, the policy actors
that moved in and around the worlds of Whitehall and Westminster. While
not denying the multi-level nature of Brexit, we must cede to the practical
reality that analysis of the subnational (devolved governments) and suprana-
tional levels (the European Union) are simply beyond the scope of this article.
Second, we use policy theory – learning in this case – to provide a more
endogenous account of Brexit by illuminating the policy dynamics that
shaped the political context in the UK. Our focus on the policy process
avoids reducing the Brexit fiasco to the artefact of parliamentary arithmetic,
but instead views the political impasse as contingent on – and in part a
product of – dysfunctional modes of learning within government.
The analysis consists of two main steps. First, we assess the nature of policy
learning around Brexit through each of the four modes. This involves mapping
how these modes shifted over time in response to the sequencing of the
Brexit process and changes in policy setting variables. Second, we explain
the effectiveness of learning through each of the four modes by analysing
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the presence or absence of critical scope conditions. The analysis relies on
process tracing of key decisions and developments related to the manage-
ment of Brexit within the UK government between June 2016 and May
2019. This is informed by analysis of public documents, think tanks reports
and media coverage over this period, together with seven anonymous inter-
views conducted with UK policy-makers and stakeholders in the summer of
2017 and 2018.
We argue that although the policy setting was well-suited to reflexive and
epistemic learning immediately following the referendum, these were hin-
dered because important scope conditions were not met (namely, open atti-
tudes and negotiation settings, fluid group identities, a culture of trust, and
the legitimacy of expertise). Learning shifted to the realm of hierarchy as
the Article 50 negotiations got underway, but this was undermined by a break-
down of political authority and institutional instability following the June 2017
election. As a result, learning around Brexit was largely restricted to bargaining,
the conditions for which (external conditionality and arena disaggregation)
were partially met. However, as illustrated by the fate of theWithdrawal Agree-
ment, this produced a highly dysfunctional form of learning that prioritised
short-term political demands (namely, government survival and party man-
agement) over long-term strategic policy thinking (about Brexit).
The article proceeds as follows. The first section reviews the policy learning
literature and the typology which we apply. The main analysis is structured
around each of the four modes of policy learning: reflexivity, epistemic, hier-
archical, and bargaining. The conclusion reflects on how the systematic analy-
sis of learning, and policy theories more generally, can contribute to our
understanding of policy fiascos.
Policy learning: literature and theory
The literature on learning is rich in typologies (for example, see Bennett and
Howlett 1992; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Heikkila and Gerlak 2013, May 1992).
The approach we consider here draws on explicit political science and adult
education theories to identify different types or ‘modes’ of policy learning
(Dunlop and Radaelli 2013). The framework posits that modes of policy learn-
ing are defined by two variables which relate to the policy setting. The first
concerns the level of uncertainty or problem tractability, which is an impor-
tant determinant of whether learning can be ‘thick’ or ‘thin’, and can be
managed through technocratic or political processes (Checkel 2001). The
second relates to the certification of actors; namely, whether actors exist
that are viewed as holding legitimate expertise on a particular subject. On a
nominal scale, these variables can be measured as low or high, thus producing
a four-fold typology: reflexive, epistemic, hierarchical, and learning through
bargaining (see Figure 1).
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At its simplest, reflexive learning relies on a dialogue between actors who
are open to new ideas and evidence about the world around them (Schön
and Rein 1994). Learning is reflexive when this interaction leads actors to cri-
tically re-evaluate their core policy beliefs and to look at the policy world in
novel ways. The policy setting variables that define reflexivity are equality
of actors in the learning process (low certification) and radical uncertainty.
In terms of scope conditions, reflexive learning is facilitated by: a relatively
open attitude of the individual participants; the presence of policy instru-
ments that allow collective problem-solving; and negotiation settings that
permit overlapping identities and do not assign hierarchies; while an impor-
tant negative scope condition (that is, hindrance) is at the level of attitudes,
that is, suspicion and luck of trust about the intentions of the others.
Epistemic learning is typically found in policy settings characterised by
radical issue uncertainty and the existence of a socially certified group of
experts (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013). The absence of a recognised epistemic
community (Haas 1992), or the presence of alternative, conflicting sources
of epistemic knowledge, are therefore hindrances to learning. Other scope
conditions include the availability of evidence-based policy instruments,
such as impact assessments (IAs). These constitute an epistemic policy tool
which provide ex ante policy appraisals, ensuring that the economic impact
of different courses of policy action are documented, grounded in consul-
tation and analysis, and available to the public. IAs are intended to guide
policy objectives, but they can also serve other functions (Dunlop et al.
2012): political (to legitimate a pre-determined policy project); dialogic (to
stimulate wider social debate about the conceptual terms of policy); or sym-
bolic (i.e., a tick-the-box exercise).
Figure 1. Modes of policy learning. Source: Dunlop and Radaelli (2013: 603).
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In learning through hierarchy, knowledge is used by actors to exert control
and is guided towards particular goals. Hierarchy is rooted in institutions –
including formal structures, organisational roles, rules of the game, codes
and norms – which shape the production, content and utilisation of knowl-
edge (Dobbin et al. 2007). Some features of hierarchies have nothing to do
with learning, e.g., authority supported by credible threats is not learning.
But individual bureaucrats, government departments, and ministers within
cabinets follow long-standing institutional rules. The hierarchical layers
within the bureaucracy allow public managers to learn what to do, when
and the role they are supposed to play. In this sense, the shadow of hierarchy
is a learning mode. If the UK government (or the EU) could have imposed a
deal on Parliament with authority supported by credible threats we would
not have been in the territory of learning. But since this was not the case,
there is a prima facie case for considering hierarchy as a mode of learning.
To operate, this mode requires low uncertainty (no ambiguity about the
behaviour that is expected when a policy problem appears) and high certifi-
cation of actors (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013: 611). The scope conditions are
stability within the organisation of the bureaucracies/government, and
shared beliefs in the legitimacy of the different roles and echelons of the
hierarchy.
Bargaining describes a mode of learning in which inter-dependent actors
trade, bargain and exchange information to secure other objectives (Dunlop
and Radaelli 2013: 610). Bargaining is common in policy settings with low
actor certification and low uncertainty (high issue tractability): in this
context, learning does not necessarily lead to the reconciliation of divergent
preferences, but it can facilitate agreement on mutually beneficial outcomes.
Learning through bargaining has two scope conditions. The first, external con-
ditionality, can take the form of externally imposed time pressures. In a
context of heightened uncertainty, deadlines facilitate bargaining by enabling
actors to more accurately calculate the pay-offs of different bargaining strat-
egies. The second condition is arena disaggregation. Bargaining may be easier
where the boundaries of negotiating arenas are clearly defined and arena
membership is fixed (Eberlein and Radaelli 2010). This enables complex
issues to be compartmentalised, and facilitates the calculation of actor pay-
offs through routinised interaction.
The following section applies the four modes of learning to Brexit. Impor-
tantly, we do not view Brexit as a static process. Rather, we recognise that the
policy setting variables shifted over time as the negotiations progressed (from
the pre-negotiation phase to the Article 50 negotiations, and then to parlia-
mentary ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement). Importantly, from our per-
spective, these dynamic settings generated new opportunities for different
types of learning (while often closing down others).1 We explain the
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effectiveness of policy learning in each case by examining whether the scope
conditions specified above were met (or not).
Learning reflexively
Of all the modes of learning we examine, Brexit is intuitively well-suited to the
policy setting variables characteristic of reflexivity: low tractability (i.e., radical
uncertainty) and low certification of actors. What Brexit means, how it can be
achieved, and its real-world consequences have long been shrouded behind a
heavy veil of ignorance. The scale of the policy challenge necessitated by
legally untangling the UK from the EU across a vast swathe of policy areas
was unprecedented. Not only was the potential number of alternative scen-
arios for Brexit unknown (and infinite), but the political and economic
impacts of technical ‘fixes’ (e.g., for the Irish border) were almost impossible
to quantify. It was also clear that few actors could claim to hold an exclusive
monopoly of expertise on the subject.
In response to this policy impasse, the government might have been
expected to encourage an extended period of reflection and consultation
so as to facilitate mutual learning through reflexivity. However, the key
scope conditions for doing so – an open attitude of individual participants
to new ideas and information, non-hierarchical negotiation settings that
allow overlapping identities and encourage dialogue, and participatory
policy instruments for collective problem-solving – were largely absent both
within and outside government. For the first twelve months of her premier-
ship, Theresa May was almost impermeable to arguments aired in cabinet,
her listening-and-learning ears sealed-off by the two powerful advisers, Nick
Timothy and Fiona Hill (see Perrior 2017). Far from consulting widely with
MPs from across her party, let alone seeking to forge a cross-party consensus,
Theresa May instead relied on a small and narrow clique of eurosceptic MPs to
formulate her early Brexit ‘strategy’ (James and Quaglia 2018). Yet in the
absence of meaningful cabinet dialogue or agreement, this meant relying
on the rhetorical tautology of ‘Brexit means Brexit’ to conceal the absence
of rank-ordered preferences, and to silence dissenting voices.
The absence of reflexivity within government reflected the widespread
culture of mistrust and suspicion generated by the referendum, and the
cabinet splits this engendered (see Shipman 2017). In response, the May Gov-
ernment attempted (but largely failed – see below) to assert control over the
process. The result of using different shades of formal power and parliamen-
tary conventions was not a problem-solving trajectory, but further political
confusion. Within cabinet, for example, mistrust gave rise to the development
of institutional venues which were deliberately designed to minimise consul-
tation and dialogue. Hence, in Autumn 2016, May established a smaller EU Exit
and Trade (Negotiations) cabinet subcommittee (consisting only of the Prime
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Minister, and five senior ministers) – not to increase organisational efficiency,
but to reduce the risk of cabinet leaks. The use of informal procedures and
conventions to assert power was also evident in the Impact Assessment
process which we narrate below. Nor was Parliament immune. For example,
the speaker of the House of Commons, John Bercow, broke with convention
by allowing a vote on the amendment to a government business motion
tabled by Conservative MP Dominic Grieve in January 2019. Similarly, in
March 2018 Bercow cited a 1604 convention to deny the government the
option of bringing the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement back to Parliament for
a third vote unless it contained significant changes. All these episodes show
how the option of learning reflexively was stymied.
Turning to political parties, the Brexit negotiations exacerbated the clash
between Remain-Leave identities. These identities fractured the existing
parties, perhaps setting the path for historical re-composition of party clea-
vages (as signalled by the formation of Change UK by disaffected MPs). Nego-
tiations with overlapping identities could conceivably have emerged via
cross-party talks leading to a compromise between the Conservative and
Labour Party. But, the commencement of these talks in spring 2019 came
far too late in the process, by which point political strategising and mutual
mistrust effectively ruled out any prospect of agreement between May and
Corbyn on the UK’s withdrawal.
Perhaps more surprising was the May Government’s failure to encourage
reflexive learning through engagement with external stakeholders, notably
business. Distrust at the heart of government led No.10 to deliberately
close down established channels of access to outsiders, rendering business
consultation largely informal and ad hoc. At ministerial level, business
leaders complained that Theresa May was ‘elusive’ compared to her predeces-
sor, and that Brexit Secretary David Davis made it known that he was only
willing to meet with those willing to speak positively about Brexit.2 For
example, Confederation of British Industry (CBI)3 Director-General Carolyn
Fairbairn was initially ‘frozen out’ of meetings with senior government
officials after she publicly accused the Prime Minister of closing the door on
the UK’s open economy. Moreover, officials made it clear that lobbyists
making any critical statements in the media about immigration, trade or
the rights of EU citizens would be punished with an immediate cessation of
access (Parker 2017). These political tensions were compounded by the cen-
tralisation of Brexit policy-making around No.10 and DExEU, and the down-
grading of the Treasury. Business groups found DExEU to be a ‘black hole’
that was largely ‘impenetrable’ to industry, forcing them to increasingly
‘sing the same tune’ as ministers in order to be granted access.4 Following
the June 2017 election, the government took steps to repair relations with
business by placing consultation on a more formal basis. To this end, a
summit was convened by Brexit Secretary David Davis for UK business
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leaders in July 2017, and the Chancellor Philip Hammond established a new
Brexit business advisory group to institutionalise relations (Gordon and
Pickard 2017). Despite this, the ability of government and business to estab-
lish a meaningful dialogue on Brexit remained very limited; either because key
decisions, such as ruling out single market membership, had already been
taken (in secret), or deferred owing to a lack of political direction.
Finally, the prospect of encouraging reflexivity amongst the wider public
was constrained by the gradual hardening of public attitudes on Remain
and Leave into distinct group identities (Clarke et al. 2017). As Sorace and
Hobolt (2019) detail, these constitute powerful normative lenses through
which voters process information and interpret evidence, thereby reinforcing
the polarisation of opinion. An alternative approach could have been to gen-
erate network-type settings from outside the formal venues of politics (Sabel
and Zeitlin 2008) – i.e., beyond the cabinet, Westminster, and Whitehall – to
facilitate a wider process of social learning (Hall 1993). For example, there
were attempts to activate politically relevant knowledge from outside govern-
ment and Parliament around Brexit with the creation of citizen’s assemblies.
Assemblies are particularly useful when Parliament is deadlocked and the
government loses key votes on priorities, as in the case of Brexit. However,
the idea gained little traction within government precisely because ministers
had little incentive to (re)open the Brexit debate.
Somewhat paradoxically, despite the policy setting for Brexit being well-
suited to this mode of learning (i.e., low tractability and low certification of
actors) we find little evidence of reflexivity. On the contrary, the main scope
conditions – namely, openness of attitudes, fluid negotiation settings, and a
culture of trust – were largely absent. This encouraged a bunker-mentality
in No.10, determined to keep control of the agenda, and using a discourse
of obfuscation to deflect challenges. This position was untenable, however,
once the UK triggered Article 50 in March 2017 and the Brexit negotiations
got underway, as the government was now forced to stake out a position.
In response, we see policy-makers attempting to move the process forwards
through other modes of learning.
Learning epistemically
Although the intractability of Brexit satisfies the first policy setting variable,
the prospects for any functional epistemic learning were stymied by the
absence of any socially and politically legitimate experts. Indeed, the referen-
dum was marked by an antipathy toward expertise, as infamously espoused
by leave campaigner and cabinet minister Michael Gove. The presence of
experts – most powerfully in the form of epistemic communities (Haas
1992) – is a critical variable in triggering epistemic learning as teaching.
Haas argues that ‘ideas would be sterile without carriers’ (1992: 27),
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meaning that the values, norms and policy direction that give ideas purpose
and form are derived from those who create them. The importance of this
anthropomorphic conceptualisation of policy knowledge bears out in the
empirical literature. Experts succeed in shaping decision-makers’ preferences
where they have both strong epistemic products – i.e., knowledge consensus
– and when they deploy human skills effectively – persuasion, leadership,
judgement.
No unified epistemic community existed to advise the government on
Brexit. The most obvious candidate – the Bank of England (BoE) – had seen
its analysis of UK withdrawal challenged as a matter of course. For example,
when BoE economists published an evaluation of the possible impacts of
various Brexit scenarios on the UK’s monetary and financial stability in Novem-
ber 2018 (BoE 2018), the figures it quoted were roundly derided by leave sup-
porting politicians (Treanor 2018). More damaging for the prospects of
epistemic learning, they were curtly dismissed via social media as ‘highly
speculative’ and ‘too severe’ by former BoE member Andrew Sentence and
Nobel prize winning economist Paul Krugman (Partington 2018). Beyond
these interventions, the wider production of contending claims (often
through social media) on Brexit’s impact made it impossible for the BoE to
claim the authoritative high ground required by expert enclaves that aim to
be principal teacher to policy-makers.
Despite the absence of any single, socially accepted knowledge carrier,
epistemic lessons could have been generated. Another powerful channel
for epistemic learning is the presence of evidence-based policy instruments,
such as impact assessments (IAs). Key to the epistemic value of this instrument
is how constellations of actors organise their interactions around IA as evi-
dence-based trigger: instrumentally, symbolically, to exercise control, or dialo-
gically. We argue that during the Brexit process, Whitehall’s reliance on IAs
vacillated between all four uses, ensuring that epistemic learning was dys-
functional. This instability, which fatally undermined the IAs’ credibility, was
generated by several factors: the early lack of transparency about the IAs;
a range of competing goals held by different actors using the IAs; and
the existence of competing IAs in the other nations of the UK, the European
Commission and European Parliament. We briefly address each in turn.
Functional epistemic learning requires robust knowledge production pro-
cesses open to scrutiny. Learning pathologies arise and policy capacity is
damaged where the process of knowledge formation appears the preserve
of ‘invisible colleges’ closed off from oversight (Regonini 2017). From the
outset, the existence, scope and content of economic analyses of Brexit
were the subject of contest. In December 2016, David Davis (then Secretary
of State for Exiting the EU) confirmed the existence of ‘about 57’ sector assess-
ments for individual parts of 85% of the economy. That same month, Parlia-
ment established a no disclosure policy to prevent public divulgence of any
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material that could be damaging to the Brexit negotiations. Throughout 2017,
Freedom of Information requests were lodged by MPs and calls made by both
Commons and Lords EU committees to have sight of the assessments. Despite
assurances in June 2017 from DExEU that the list of sectors would be pub-
lished ‘shortly’, Davis later asserted the need to balance ‘our commitment
to transparency with the need to protect information which could undermine
the UK’s ability to negotiate the best deal for the UK’ (Davis 2017). But pressure
continued to build and, in November 2017, Parliament dusted down and
deployed an arcane procedure called a ‘motion to return’ (Defty 2017).
From this point, the assessments (ultimately totalling 39) were released to
EU committees in both Houses of Parliament and from then aspects were
published or leaked before their final public disclosure in March 2018.
While it is not common practice for IAs to be released as they are being
conducted, these are no ordinary sets of analyses. The lack of early disclosure
to the relevant parliamentary committees, and uncertainty about just how
many had been compiled ensured the IAs became a way to express dissent
about the transparency and government dominance of the Brexit process.
An analytical tool which was deployed with the promise of offering civil ser-
vants much needed forecasts and technical knowledge, became a tool that
opened-up debate rendering either (or both) the analysis itself, or the govern-
ment, suspect.
Further down the line, the government’s use of IA changed. As the withdra-
wal deal was being agreed in late 2018, and with Davis having resigned from
his position, Treasury assessments of the economic impact of the Chequers
Plan were made public. The original aspirations outlined by Theresa May
were predicted to result in a contraction in the UK economy of up to
3.9% over 15 years (HM Government 2018). The use of IA was highly political:
not only was the actual agreed deal – which differed from the Prime Minister’s
favoured plan – not assessed, the 3.9% contraction was then compared to
other less favourable scenarios of a free trade agreement (6.7% contraction)
and no deal (9.1% contraction). This political approach by the government
was then mirrored by politicians and commentators. Cherry-picking facts
became the order of the day with the exclusion of economic growth used
by Brexit supporters as the reason for the poor forecasts (‘this is project
fear’) and the absence of regional breakdowns used by remainers to warn
the forecasts were too optimistic (‘we are looking into the abyss’).
Yet, such criticisms are not entirely unjustified. The logic of IA is that policy-
relevant knowledge about the socio-economic consequences of policy paths
is knowable. The extent to which the impacts of Brexit can be reliably esti-
mated is debateable. In such circumstances, IA as process and product has
vehicular qualities – it can be used by political actors of all sides to carry radi-
cally different interpretations (see McLennan 2004 on vehicular ideas).
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The final dimension to this dysfunctional epistemic learning is the presence
of competing sites of knowledge production. While the struggle for access
played out in Westminster, IAs were being prepared and published by
other governments at sub and supranational levels, sector agencies (for
example, Financial Conduct Authority [FCA] 2018) and think tanks (for
example, the Institute for Government [IfG] – see Tetlow and Stojanovic
2018). The extent to which the presence of competing IAs substantively
undermined the Whitehall analyses, or diluted the clarity of the message, is
a story that remains to be told. What matters here is that their very existence
was enough to undermine the credibility of the analysis as something which
could contain debate regarding the fundamentals of policy. That said, though
the detail of the IAs did not show up in policy outputs, as the original deadline
to leave the EU (29 March 2019) loomed, they had some political purchase.
The fact that IAs of all governments agreed that the issue was not one of
the likelihood of economic damage, but rather of its magnitude, was impor-
tant in destabilising Theresa May’s Lancaster House assertion ‘no deal is
better than a bad deal’.
If anything, knowledge and access to knowledge became the territory of
sharp political and institutional conflicts. The scope conditions for learning
epistemically were violated. On the one hand, economic knowledge and
the appraisal of the likely effects of policy options via experts in the BoE
and specific policy tools like IAs did not make an impact on the strategy
and choices of the main actors. On the other, the very presence of this knowl-
edge became an issue of sharp confrontation between Parliament and the
executive. In the end, who qualifies as an expert and the very meaning of
what an impact assessment is and should do became fuzzy and controversial,
casting doubts on the possibility of this type of knowledge utilisation in the
Brexit process.
Learning through hierarchy
In a post-referendum context of high uncertainty and low certification, the
operation of hierarchical learning through the British political system
became highly dysfunctional. To be precise, while the symbols of formal hier-
archy of the Westminster-Whitehall model (Richards et al. 2019) remained in
place – namely, prime ministerial direction, cabinet responsibility
and parliamentary procedures – the normal rules, norms, conventions and
standard operating procedures underpinning them broke down. To explain
why, we identify two scope conditions, the absence of which undermined
the possibility of rule-based learning about Brexit.
The first scope condition is that roles and hierarchical lines are accepted,
not contested. This condition was fatally undermined by the extent of minis-
terial divisions triggered by the 2016 referendum, compounded by the
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breakdown of cabinet collective responsibility following the 2017 general
election. The impact of these political fault lines at official level was highly per-
nicious, eroding well-established norms of information sharing and coordi-
nation between Whitehall departments. Instead, it encouraged ‘a culture of
extraordinary secrecy’ where key documents were ‘over-classified’ to
prevent them from being shared between departments (Owen et al. 2018).
Even ‘rudimentary planning guidance’ was made largely inaccessible,
restricted to hard copies or secure computers only available to a limited
number of officials in designated Whitehall reading rooms or a permanent
secretary’s office (Owen et al. 2018).
The relationship between (Brexit-supporting) ministers and senior civil ser-
vants was shaken, generating instability. Suspicion that Whitehall was ‘institu-
tionally anti-Brexit’ spilled over into outright hostility, leading to the
resignation of the UK’s permanent representative to the EU (Sir Ivan Rogers)
and undermining the position of the UK’s lead official negotiator (Oliver
Robbins). In the absence of clear policy goals, poor information flows and
competing ministerial preferences, effective policy coordination proved
‘impossible’ and the alignment of departmental contingency plans was
made ‘very difficult’ (Owen et al. 2018).
A key illustration of these problems was the planning guidance issued by
the Cabinet Secretary to all departments to guide their Brexit preparations in
March 2017. The difficulty of getting political agreement on key issues meant
that there were large gaps, while the high level of security clearance needed
to view the document, meant that critical information was not widely distrib-
uted to front line officials (Owen et al. 2018: 33). As a result, departments
increasingly made their own assumptions about what preparations were
necessary, guided by their minister’s view of the consequences of different
Brexit scenarios.
Institutional stability is a second scope condition for rule-based behaviour.
Since the UK’s accession in 1973, the model for EU policy coordination
revolved around the ‘quad’ of the Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO), the UK Permanent Representation (UKRep) in Brussels and, on
economic and budgetary issues, the Treasury (James 2011). Following the
referendum, however, Prime Minister May subverted this structure by estab-
lishing a new Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU) responsible
for leading the Brexit negotiations, coordinating activity across government,
and undertaking policy work related to the UK’s future relationship with the
EU. In addition, a new Department for International Trade was established
to prepare and negotiate new trade agreements with non-EU countries
after Brexit.
These institutional changes undermined learning by challenging the pos-
ition of traditionally powerful departments, particularly the Treasury and
FCO. Lines of responsibility were blurred by the fact that the UK’s lead
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official negotiator, Oliver Robbins, had a dual reporting line to the Brexit Sec-
retary and Prime Minister. As the IfG think tank documented, this created ten-
sions with No.10, which ultimately had responsibility for the success or failure
of the negotiations, and with departments who viewed DExEU as a depart-
mental player, rather than as a more conventional broker (Rutter and
McCrae 2016). Robbins’ move to the Cabinet Office in September 2017 was
an attempt to establish a clearer hierarchy by centralising responsibility as
the Brexit negotiations entered a critical phase. But this had the effect of
undermining the position of DExEU, contributing to its high turnover of min-
isters and senior officials (with only a single junior minister remaining in place
since 2016), and eroding its capacity for institutional memory and accumu-
lation of expertise over time. This limited DExEU’s capacity to manage the
Brexit preparations process, making it difficult to coordinate or assess the
coherence of departmental plans.
More widely, the creation of DExEU depleted the internal resources and
expertise of other departments through secondments, and sparked a bureau-
cratic turf war over ownership of key Brexit policy dossiers (Owen et al. 2018).
Learning across all Whitehall departments was also seriously disrupted by
heightened staff turnover triggered by the Brexit preparations. The IfG
reports that officials took advantage of the promotional opportunities stem-
ming from the creation of approximately 10,000 new posts created since
the EU referendum. For example, turnover at DExEU was running at 9% a
quarter at the end of 2017, compared to a civil service average of 9% a
year (Sasse and Norris 2019).
Once the Brexit negotiations got underway, it was not surprising that the
government defaulted to the standard operating procedures of the Westmin-
ster-Whitehall model (Richards et al. 2019), characterised by executive auton-
omy and centralised policy-making. That this proved wholly unsuited to the
task in hand did not simply reflect the context of high uncertainty and low
certification, however, but also strategic decisions (the 2017 election) and
institutional reforms (the creation of DExEU) that fatally eroded political auth-
ority and institutional stability, which are essential for hierarchical learning.
Learning through bargaining
According to our theory, learning through bargaining was not appropriate
under conditions of high uncertainty (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013). In this situ-
ation, the theory predicts that learning will be dysfunctional because actors
cannot calculate the pay-offs of different bargaining strategies. This can be
ameliorated, in part, if an important scope condition – external conditionality
– is met. For example, externally imposed time pressures can incentivise bar-
gaining by facilitating the calculation of pay-offs. In the case of Brexit, external
pressures were imposed by the timing and sequencing of the EU’s Article 50
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process: namely, the two-year deadline for reaching a deal on withdrawal, and
the sequencing (and separation) of this from the future relationship nego-
tiations (see Armstrong 2017). Although these time pressures eased bargain-
ing between rival factions to some extent, they also generated a limited form
of learning that prioritised short-term political demands (e.g., government sur-
vival or party management) over long-term strategic policy thinking (over
Brexit).
This dysfunctionality was compounded by the absence of a second scope
condition – arena disaggregation – which enables bargaining to be compart-
mentalised and routinised (Eberlein and Radaelli 2010). The clearest illus-
tration of arena overlap in the case of Brexit is the fact that the UK
government was simultaneously bargaining with two sets of actors
(Member of Parliament [MPs] and EU negotiators) in a two-level game. Yet
even in the domestic context, if the principal venue for bargaining shifts
over time as the negotiations progress, this expands the range of actors
involved and makes the issue even more intractable. During the Brexit
process, we observe a gradual process of expansion across three, overlapping
arenas which undermined bargaining.
The first arena, in the immediate aftermath of the referendum, involved a
small coterie of senior officials and MPs. In the political vacuum created by the
Conservative leadership contest, an unofficial Brexit Cabinet, whose members
were close to the Eurosceptic ‘All Souls Group’ within the party, became highly
influential in shaping the learning process.5 Given the Conservatives’ slim par-
liamentary majority of 17, they concluded that the government had little
choice but to adopt a hard Brexit position, which meant ending freedom of
movement, to secure the support of pro-Brexit backbenchers.6 Under
Theresa May, this hardened into a broader electoral strategy, developed by
No.10 Chief of Staff Nick Timothy and Director of Strategy Chris Wilkins,
designed to address the wider social grievances that were perceived to
have contributed to Brexit (Shipman 2017: 140–144).
The second arena of bargaining became particularly important following
the Conservatives’ loss of their parliamentary majority in June 2017 (see
Wincott 2017), forcing May to increasingly bargain with her own cabinet
and wider parliamentary party for survival. But this constrained the develop-
ment of a coherent Brexit strategy, forcing key decisions on the future
relationship to be deferred, and preventing government departments from
undertaking effective preparations (Lloyd 2019). Time spent on intra-party
bargaining also left the EU to set the agenda, monopolising the production
of key negotiating texts and guidelines, thereby reducing its own scope for
compromise and ‘boxing in’ the UK (Owen et al. 2018). As a result, UK nego-
tiators were forced into a series of incremental and last-minute concessions to
reach agreement with the EU. For example, May’s Florence speech in Septem-
ber 2017 tentatively suggested that the UK might agree to a status quo
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transition period of ‘around two years’, agreement on which was only reached
in March 2018. Similarly, to hammer out an agreement between competing
factions within cabinet, the Prime Minister convened the Chequers summit
in July 2018. The White Paper that followed – pledging to maintain a
common rulebook for goods, but not for services, and to seek a ‘facilitated’
customs arrangement – represented a carefully crafted (but short-lived)
cabinet compromise.
The Conservatives’ precarious parliamentary position also necessitated
careful bargaining between competing party factions; namely, the pro-
Brexit Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the European Research Group
(ERG), and two groups of former Remainers – those that favour a soft Brexit
(the so-called Common Market 2.0), and those who support a second referen-
dum. In an effort to secure passage of the Withdrawal Agreement, the govern-
ment was often more willing to concede ground to the ERG, such as by
accepting multiple amendments (Lloyd 2019: 32). It also made significant con-
cessions to the DUP, offering them the de facto right to prevent UK-wide
divergence from EU regulation, and a formal role in the future relationship
negotiations.
The third arena, concerned with the passage of Brexit legislation, included
the whole of Parliament. Despite the government’s early attempts to limit its
involvement, MPs gradually accrued important new powers over the Brexit
process. For example, the EU Withdrawal Act took almost a year to get
through Parliament and the government was forced to grant MPs a ‘meaning-
ful vote’ on the final deal (Dixon and Williams 2018). Similarly, in a desperate
attempt to secure parliamentary support for the Withdrawal Agreement, the
government deliberately sought to portray this as a ‘one shot’ game, the
reversion point of which would be a chaotic no deal Brexit.
Ultimately, however, this strategy was thwarted by MPs who used arcane
parliamentary procedures to seize control of the legislative timetable. This cul-
minated in March 2019 with a series of ‘indicative votes’, which can be inter-
preted as an attempt to facilitate learning through bargaining in three ways.
First, the votes were used as a mechanism of generating information about
MPs’ preferences, and thus the scope of potential agreement in Parliament
(Fox and Baston 2019). Second, the push by MPs to de-couple procedural
issues from substantive ones sought to reduce the friction from bargaining,
whereby agreement on the process may pave the way for agreement on
the outcome. Third, the indicative votes attempted to circumvent the intract-
ability of the Irish backstop issue in the Withdrawal Agreement by explicitly
linking it to a range of different options on the future relationship – a
process known an ‘issue-aggregation’ (Eberlein and Radaelli 2010).
The learning that resulted was dysfunctional in the sense that it still pro-
duced no agreement in Parliament, forcing the Prime Minister to request a
further extension of the Article 50 process to 31 October 2019. But it did
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force May to change strategy and open cross-party talks with the Labour party
in early April 2019 in an attempt to end the impasse. By shifting the Brexit
process back to a small, closed negotiating arena, these talks represent the
latest iteration of (dysfunctional) learning through bargaining. That these sub-
sequently collapsed in May 2019, heralding Theresa May’s own departure as
Prime Minister, is perhaps a fitting epitaph to the limitations of bargaining
under these conditions.
Conclusion
This article asked how did the UK government seek to learn during the Brexit
negotiations? We found that although the policy setting was well-suited to
reflexive and epistemic learning immediately following the referendum,
these were hindered because important scope conditions were not met
(namely, open attitudes and negotiation settings, fluid group identities, a
culture of trust, and the legitimacy of expertise). Learning shifted to the
realm of hierarchy as the Article 50 negotiations got underway, but this was
undermined by a breakdown of political authority and institutional instability
following the June 2017 election. As a result, learning around Brexit was
largely restricted to bargaining, the conditions for which (external condition-
ality and arena disaggregation) were partially met. However, as illustrated by
the fate of the Withdrawal Agreement, this produced a highly dysfunctional
form of learning that prioritised short-term political demands (namely, gov-
ernment survival and party management) over long-term strategic policy
thinking (about Brexit).
We conclude by reflecting on the broader theoretical and empirical contri-
bution of the article. With respect to the wider theoretical literature on policy
learning, we suggest that it makes a threefold contribution: (1) demonstrating
the utility of analysing policy fiascos through time-sensitive policy learning
theory, (2) examining temporal dynamics in granular policy processes to
explain how learning shifts between different modes over time, and (3) asses-
sing learning through the identification and empirical analysis of scope con-
ditions. Taken together, these contributions point to the potential of
learning as a theoretical lens on the policy process and macro-events like
Brexit. Key policy dynamics – in this case, dysfunctional policy learning –
did not simply reflect, but also served to shape the wider political context
within which they are located. We assert that this ultimately contributed to
the intractability of Brexit as a policy issue. The politics of Brexit do not
simply determine the policy; but rather policy dynamics play an important
role in shaping the political context within which they are located. Put differ-
ently, studies like ours serve to endogenise existing accounts of Brexit.
Finally, we recognise important limitations in our analysis. Notably, the fact
that as a single country case study, the ability to generalise from our findings
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is necessarily limited. Some may also object that Brexit is sui generis, making
comparison to other policy issues problematic. Nonetheless, we maintain that
analysing a single case such as Brexit over time enables a depth of analysis
that would otherwise not be possible. Furthermore, while the politics of
Brexit has many unique characteristics, as a policy it arguably shares many
of the same dynamics of process – including learning – as any other. Using
policy theories to illuminate these therefore avoids reductionist political
explanations, while potentially facilitating comparison with other prominent
cases of policy fiascos. Doing so holds out the promise of being able to
extract longer-term lessons from the Brexit experience.
Notes
1. We do not claim that learning during the Brexit process was perfectly sequential:
while the possibility of learning through some modes (reflexive and epistemic)
was apparent throughout the process, the policy settings conducive to other
modes (hierarchy and bargaining) were more specific to particular time periods.
2. Interview with senior bank lobbyist in London, 14 June 2017.
3. The CBI is the largest association representing British business.
4. Interview with trade association representative in London, 18 July 2017.
5. Interview with bank lobbyist in London, 10 July 2017.
6. Interview with government minister in London, 20 February 2017.
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